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NON-CONSENSUAL PORN AND THE 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF ONLINE INTERMEDIARIES 
N I C O L A S  SU Z O R , *  BRYO N Y  SE I G N IO R †  
A N D  J E N N I F E R  SI N G L E T O N ‡  
This article considers the legal options for the victims of non-consensual distribution of 
sexually explicit media — sometimes known as ‘revenge porn’. The Australian Law 
Reform Commission has called for Australia to introduce a new tort for serious invasions 
of privacy, and the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee has 
recently reinforced the need for stronger penalties. A private members’ Bill was introduced 
in the last federal Parliament, but has since lapsed. Each of these proposals focuses 
primarily on the wrongful acts of the perpetrator. As a deterrent and a strong signal of 
social opprobrium, they may be partially effective. They do not, however, consider in 
detail how victims may be able to seek some relief once material has already been posted 
online. In this article, we consider explicitly what role internet intermediaries should play 
in responding to abuse online. The challenge in developing effective policy is not only to 
provide a remedy against the primary wrongdoer, but to impose some obligations on the 
platforms that host or enable access to harmful material. This is a difficult and complex 
issue, but only by engaging with these processes are we likely to develop regulatory 
regimes that are likely to be reasonably effective. 
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I   I N T R O D U C T IO N :  T H E  SC O P E  O F  T H E  P R O B L E M 
This article considers how to regulate the non-consensual distribution of 
intimate images and videos. This problem, although not new, has been 
magnified in recent times by a series of social changes brought by new 
technologies — ubiquitous digital cameras, the ease of distributing content 
online and the commonplace use of cloud services to store personal infor-
mation.1 We consider how the law can and ought to change to deal with new 
threats posed by the use of new technologies. 
The contexts in which people may lose control over their intimate images 
are many and varied. In some cases, it might be that a person who received or 
recorded an image with the consent of the subject later breaches that trust by 
sharing it more broadly. The term ‘revenge porn’ was popularised from the 
time the website ‘Is Anyone Up?’ was founded in late 2010.2 The site featured 
thousands of sexually explicit images of people, predominantly women, 
accompanied by identifying information and belligerent comments.3 These 
images were usually submitted to the site by an ex-lover without the consent 
of the person depicted, as a form of ‘revenge’ for a break-up. At the height of 
its popularity, Is Anyone Up? received 30 million page views per month.4 The 
site has since been shut down,5 but there are still many outlets where explicit 
images are shared without the permission of the person depicted. 
 
 1 Michael Salter and Thomas Crofts, ‘Responding to Revenge Porn: Challenges to Online Legal 
Impunity’ in Lynn Comella and Shira Tarrant (eds), New Views on Pornography: Sexuality, 
Politics, and the Law (Praeger, 2015) 233, 234–5. 
 2 Ibid 239. 
 3 Ibid 240. 
 4 Derek E Bambauer, ‘Exposed’ (2014) 98 Minnesota Law Review 2025, 2027, citing Memphis 
Barker, ‘“Revenge Porn” Is No Longer a Niche Activity which Victimises Only  
Celebrities — The Law Must Intervene’, The Independent (online), 19 May 2013 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/revenge-porn-is-no-longer-a-niche-
activity-which-victimises-only-celebrities-the-law-must-intervene-8622574.html>. 
 5 Salter and Crofts, above n 1, 239. 
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In other cases, the attackers may be wholly unknown to the victim. In a 
series of attacks in 2014, attackers broke into the Apple iCloud accounts of 
hundreds of people, including several dozen celebrities, and released hun-
dreds of intimate images to the public at large (known as ‘the Fappening’).6 
Shortly after the iCloud celebrity attacks, another cloud-based leak saw 
attackers release over 100 000 private images sent through the Snapchat app.7 
The second attack, dubbed ‘the Snappening’, targeted a third-party website 
(snapsaved.com) that allowed users to surreptitiously save images sent 
through the Snapchat app.8 
The term ‘revenge porn’ is potentially misleading in dangerous ways.9 The 
term is too narrow to cover the circumstances in which people suffer harm 
outside of an intimate relationship. For example, ‘the Snappening’ was not 
‘revenge’ in any sense of the word, as the attackers were not even known to the 
victims. Perhaps of more concern, the term encourages victim blaming by 
presupposing some wrongdoing on the victim’s part — that the abusive act of 
releasing intimate images is somehow done in ‘revenge’ for some perceived 
wrong.10 Alternative terms to ‘revenge porn’ include ‘non-consensual distribu-
tion of private sexual material’ or ‘non-consensual sharing of intimate images’. 
More broadly, the phenomenon is one facet of the larger problem of ‘techno-
logically facilitated sexual violence’.11 
For victims, the non-consensual posting and sharing of sexually explicit 
imagery is a devastating problem. Victims are often subject to harassment and 
 
 6 Thomas Fox-Brewster, ‘Stealing Nude Pics from iCloud Requires Zero Hacking Skills: Just 
Some YouTube Guides’, Forbes (online), 16 March 2016 
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2016/03/16/icloud-hacking-jennifer-
lawrence-fappening-apple-nude-photo-leaks/#20318bab75b3>. 
 7 Rashid Razag, ‘Snapchat Hackers Release 100,000 Videos and Photographs Including Explicit 
Images of Children’, Evening Standard (online), 13 October 2014 
<www.standard.co.uk/news/techandgadgets/snapchat-hackers-release-100000-videos-and-
photographs-including-explicit-images-of-children-9790598.html>. 
 8 Ibid. Unless saved by the user, Snapchat images typically expire between 1–10 seconds after 
they have been received. 
 9 See Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, Parliament of Australia, 
Phenomenon Colloquially Referred to as ‘Revenge Porn’ (2016) 15 [2.3] (‘Revenge Porn  
Senate Report’). 
 10 Ibid 15–16 [2.4]–[2.5]. 
 11 Revenge Porn Senate Report, above n 9, 16 [2.8], quoting Project Respect, Submission No 21 
to Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, Inquiry into Phenomenon 
Colloquially Referred to as ‘Revenge Porn’, 14 January 2016, 4. 
1060 Melbourne University Law Review [Vol 40:1057 
abuse, particularly if they are female.12 As images are posted, the primary 
invasion of privacy often cascades into severe ongoing shaming of women’s 
bodies and sexuality by those who comment upon and spread the images 
across networks.13 Victims report serious harms that stem from both public 
slurs and a sense of powerlessness to stop the spread of either the images or 
the comments.14 Where victims are easily identifiable (and the images show 
up in search results for their names), victims have also reported significant 
abuse online and offline, the loss of professional and educational opportuni-
ties and exposure to stalking, as well as increased risk of harm and violence 
when they speak out.15 This can cause a crisis of identity for victims, as they 
lose the ability to control how they are presented to the world.16  
More generally, the problem of non-consensual sharing of intimate images 
occurs within a broader context of sexual and domestic violence. Explicit 
images are increasingly used by sexual partners ‘as a tool to threaten, harass 
and/or control both current and former partners.’17 Abusers deploy the threat 
of releasing images, either broadly or directly to the victim’s employers,18 or 
immediate or extended family in order to intimidate their victims — includ-
ing, in some cases, to prevent the victim from bringing formal complaints of 
domestic violence.19 When images are circulated by partners on social 
networks and through sites that are made up of people the victim knows, the 
material not only has the capacity to quickly reach a large audience, but the 
harms are also direct and more personalised.20 The reputational effects, in 
these cases, are thus not the more abstract fear that images are indexed and 
searchable on the wider internet, but the direct and certain knowledge that 
 
 12 See, eg, Salter and Crofts, above n 1, 238–9; Danielle Keats Citron and Mary Anne Franks, 
‘Criminalizing Revenge Porn’ (2014) 49 Wake Forest Law Review 345, 353. 
 13 See Ganaele Langlois and Andrea Slane, ‘Economies of Reputation: The Case of Revenge 
Porn’ (2017) 14 Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 120, 126–7. 
 14 For more on the consequences of online abuse, see Nancy S Kim, ‘Web Site Proprietorship 
and Online Harassment’ [2009] Utah Law Review 993, 1010. 
 15 See Citron and Franks, above n 12, 347–52; Paul J Larkin Jr, ‘Revenge Porn, State Law, and 
Free Speech’ (2014) 48 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 57, 65. 
 16 Langlois and Slane, above n 13. 
 17 Nicola Henry and Anastasia Powell, ‘Beyond the “Sext”: Technology-Facilitated Sexual 
Violence and Harassment against Adult Women’ (2015) 48 Australian and New Zealand 
Journal of Criminology 104, 113. 
 18 Citron and Franks, above n 12, 352. 
 19 Henry and Powell, above n 17, 113. 
 20 Law Reform Committee, Parliament of Victoria, Inquiry into Sexting (2013) 191–2 (‘Inquiry 
into Sexting’). 
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they are accessible to acquaintances of the victim.21 The stigma and shame 
that is frequently attached to women’s bodies and sexuality22 can cause 
immense harm for victims.23 Tragically, there have been cases reported in the 
United States (‘US’) and Canada where young women have committed suicide 
when their images were disseminated without their consent.24 
A  Civil Remedies and Criminal Offences 
Much of the focus of legislators in responding to non-consensual sharing of 
intimate images has been centred on the introduction of new criminal and 
civil remedies that target the primary abusive act. Currently, in Australia, civil 
law provides few remedies for victims. There is no general individual right to 
privacy in Australia.25 The Australian Law Reform Commission’s (‘ALRC’) 
successive recommendations for the introduction of a statutory tort of serious 
invasion of privacy26 have been unanswered for the past nine years.27 Victims 
might have a remedy under stalking offences, but generally only where the 
conduct is repeated and causes fear or alarm.28 Defamation law is unlikely to 
provide an avenue for compensation for the reputational harm that results 
from the publication of imagery now that truth is an unqualified defence in all 
states.29 An action in copyright requires the victim to be the author of the 
 
 21 Citron and Franks, above n 15, 350. 
 22 Victims are predominantly, but not exclusively, women: see below nn 67–72 and  
accompanying text. 
 23 Inquiry into Sexting, above n 20, 43–4. 
 24 Ibid 43. 
 25 See especially Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479; 
Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (2001) 208 CLR 199. 
Cf Grosse v Purvis (2003) Aust Torts Reports ¶81–706. 
 26 Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and 
Practice, Report No 108 (2008) vol 1, 88–90; Australian Law Reform Commission, Serious 
Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era, Report No 123 (2014) 59–62 [4.1]–[4.14] (‘ALRC 
Serious Invasions of Privacy Report’). 
 27 Normann Witzleb, ‘It’s Time for Privacy Invasion to Be a Legal Wrong’, The Conversation 
(online), 4 September 2014 <https://theconversation.com/its-time-for-privacy-invasion-to-
be-a-legal-wrong-31288>. 
 28 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 35; Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s 13; 
Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) sch 1 s 189; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 19AA; 
Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 192; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 21A. 
 29 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 136; Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 26; Defamation Act 
2006 (NT) s 23; Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) s 26; Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 24; Defamation 
Act 2005 (Tas) s 26; Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) s 26; Defamation Act 2005 (WA) s 26. 
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photo30 — which means victims only have a remedy where their selfies are 
leaked and not when the photo is taken by a current or ex-partner. 
Victims will often have a cause of action under the equitable doctrine of 
breach of confidence,31 at least against threatened disclosure and at the stage 
where the imagery is first posted.32 This will likely apply both in cases where 
images are captured within the context of an intimate relationship and where 
images are taken without consent from hacked accounts or devices.33 Once an 
image has been made public to a sufficiently wide audience, however, it will 
likely lose its confidential character — which means that victims have no real 
recourse against secondary distributors. 
There are existing offences at both state and federal levels that are suffi-
ciently broad to criminalise the non-consensual distribution of intimate 
imagery. Section 474.17 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) prohibits the use 
of communication networks to menace, harass or cause offence to another.34 
This is an extremely broadly-worded provision35 that carries a maximum 
sentence of three years’ imprisonment. This offence is certainly sufficiently 
broadly-worded to cover the non-consensual distribution of intimate images 
online, but it has not been widely used to date. According to the Australian 
Federal Police, s 474.17 has not been widely used in relation to  
non-consensual sharing of intimate images,36 although there are some 
 
 30 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 35(2). 
 31 Corrs Pavey Whiting & Byrne v Collector of Customs (Vic) (1987) 14 FCR 434, 443  
(Gummow J); Smith Kline & French Laboratories (Aust) Ltd v Secretary, Department of Com-
munity Services and Health (1990) 22 FCR 73, 86–7 (Gummow J) (‘Smith Kline’). 
 32 See Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1, where damages were awarded to a woman for breach of 
confidence after her former partner distributed their sexually explicit videotapes with the 
intention of humiliating and embarrassing her; Wilson v Ferguson [2015] WASC 15  
(16 January 2015) where the plaintiff was awarded compensation and an injunction prohibit-
ing her former partner from further publishing explicit images and videos that he had posted 
to his Facebook profile. 
 33 The obligation arises where the information is imparted on the understanding that it is to be 
treated as confidential or where the receiver ought to have realised that in all the circum-
stances the information was to be treated as confidential: Smith Kline (1990) 22 FCR 73,  
86–7; Coulthard v South Australia (1995) 63 SASR 531, 545–7 (Debelle J). 
 34 Note that criminal liability does not extend to an internet service provider or content host in 
their normal operations: Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 473.5. 
 35 Alan Davidson, Social Media and Electronic Commerce Law (Cambridge University Press,  
2nd ed, 2016) 354. 
 36 Revenge Porn Senate Report, above n 9, 28 [3.8]. 
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unreported judgments,37 and the provision is likely to be dealt with more  
widely summarily.38 
Each state and territory in Australia has an offence prohibiting the distri-
bution or publication of obscene or indecent material.39 These offences can be 
used to address ‘revenge porn’,40 although their suitability in this context has 
been questioned. The offences are a somewhat awkward fit for the harm in 
question, and there is a good argument that the language of ‘indecency’ or 
‘obscenity’ has the potential to further entrench victim blaming in contempo-
rary culture.41 In addition to these general offences, there have been moves to 
introduce new criminal offences specifically targeting those who distribute 
intimate images, such as in South Australia and Victoria. The new s 26C of the 
Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA), introduced in 2013, creates an offence for 
distributing an ‘invasive image’ of another person, knowing or having reason 
to believe that the other person does not consent to the distribution of the 
image.42 In 2014, Victoria created offences of maliciously distributing, or 
threatening to distribute, intimate images without consent.43 Western Austral-
ia has proposed to introduce a new power to prevent distribution of intimate 
material as part of a domestic violence order, backed by a criminal penalty of 
 
 37 See, eg, R v McDonald (2013) A Crim R 185; DPP (Cth) v Haynes [2017] VSCA 79  
(6 April 2017). 
 38 See, eg, Dever v Commissioner of Police [2017] QDC 65 (22 March 2017) (involving an 
appeal against conviction in the Caloundra Magistrate’s Court). 
 39 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 578C; Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) sch 1 ss 125A, 125C; Criminal 
Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 228; Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 33; Criminal Code Act 1924 
(Tas) s 138; Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 204A (which prohibits showing 
offensive material to a child under 16). 
 40 For example, the New South Wales provision was used in response to a 2011 revenge 
pornography case, Police v Usmanov [2011] NSWLC 40 (9 November 2011), where the de-
fendant pleaded guilty when charged with posting six intimate photos of his former partner 
to his Facebook page without her consent. 
 41 Legislative Council Standing Committee on Law and Justice, Parliament of New South Wales, 
Remedies for the Serious Invasion of Privacy in New South Wales (2016)  
34–5 [3.32]–[3.33]. 
 42 A maximum penalty of $10 000 or two years’ imprisonment applies (unless the image is of a 
person under 17, in which case the penalty is doubled). An ‘invasive image’ is defined to 
mean a moving or still image of a person ‘(a) engaged in a private act; or (b) in a state of 
undress such that (i) in the case of a female — the bare breasts are visible; or (ii) the person’s 
bare genital or anal region is visible’, but does not include an image of a person who is in a 
public place: Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) ss 26A(2)–(3). 
 43 Summary Offences Act 1966 (Vic) ss 41DA, 41DB. ‘Intimate image’ is defined as ‘a moving or 
still image that depicts (a) a person engaged in sexual activity … (b) a person in a manner or 
context that is sexual; or (c) the genital or anal region of a person or, in the case of a female, 
the breasts’: at s 40 (definition of ‘intimate image’). 
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up to two years imprisonment.44 The New South Wales Attorney-General, 
Gabrielle Upton, announced in September 2016 that the State will introduce a 
new criminal provision.45 A number of international jurisdictions have also 
made moves to criminalise both the threat and the actual distribution of 
intimate images without consent from the subject.46 
At a federal level, a recent report of the Commonwealth Senate Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs References Committee (‘Senate LACARC’) recom-
mended that Commonwealth, state, and territory governments create a series 
of new criminal offences targeting the non-consensual recording or sharing of 
intimate images, and threats to share those images.47 In the last Parliament, 
opposition MPs Tim Watts and Terri Butler proposed in a private member’s 
Bill a new criminal offence for using a carriage service for publishing or 
distributing private sexual material.48 The Bill would have introduced a new 
offence of using a carriage service for publishing or distributing private sexual 
material.49 The Bill lapsed at the dissolution of Parliament in April 2016. 
It is possible that new criminal offences will help deter people from dis-
tributing intimate images without consent.50 They would likely at least send a 
strong message that doing so is widely disapproved of in Australian society.51 
If law enforcement officers and prosecutors are appropriately directed, trained 
and resourced, it may also shift the burdens of enforcement away from victims 
who in the past have reported experiencing ‘trenchant disinterest and 
 
 44 Restraining Orders and Related Legislation Amendment (Family Violence) Bill  
2016 (WA) s 14. 
 45 NSW Government, The Sharing of Intimate Images without Consent – ‘Revenge Porn’, 
Discussion Paper (2016) <http://www.justice.nsw.gov.au/justicepolicy/Documents/ 
discussion-paper-sharing-intimate-images-14092016.pdf>. 
 46 See especially Legislative Council Standing Committee on Law and Justice, above n 41,  
53 [3.117]–[3.119] which notes that the Philippines, Israel, Japan, Canada, New Zealand, the 
United Kingdom and 26 states in the US have introduced or are drafting new laws specifically 
to address revenge porn. 
 47 Revenge Porn Senate Report, above n 9, vii [5.18]–[5.19]. 
 48 Criminal Code Amendment (Private Sexual Material) Bill 2015 (Cth). The Bill would have 
defined the meaning of private sexual material to cover media depicting people engaged in a 
‘sexual pose or sexual activity’, a person depicted in a sexual context and media depicting a 
sexual organ, anal region, or breast of a female, intersex or transgender person or someone 
who identifies as a female: at s 474.24D. It would have imposed a maximum penalty of im-
prisonment up to three years for distribution of private sexual material and an aggravated 
offence of imprisonment up to five years where there is a purpose of commercial gain or 
benefit: at s 474.24G. 
 49 Ibid s 474.24E. 
 50 Salter and Crofts, above n 1, 245–7. 
 51 Inquiry into Sexting, above n 20, 150. 
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unresponsiveness’52 when cases were reported to authorities.53 There are 
anecdotal signs that this is changing, and police are now more regularly 
charging defendants for distributing non-consensual pornography under both 
the Commonwealth and relevant state offences. Unfortunately, no rigorous 
research exists to date as to the extent or outcomes of prosecutions under 
these laws, and there are few reported cases. More empirical work to under-
stand how these offences are being used and to evaluate their effectiveness 
would be very helpful. 
There are, at any rate, important limits to the extent to which actions di-
rectly aimed at the perpetrators can be effective. Both criminal prosecutions 
and civil actions are costly, time-consuming, not readily accessible and may 
exacerbate the pain already experienced by victims due to drawn out process-
es and unwanted publicity.54 The remedies available for civil litigants may not 
adequately compensate victims for the harm they have suffered, particularly 
where perpetrators do not have sufficient financial resources.55 For victims 
who have suffered domestic violence, it is often exceedingly difficult to seek 
redress through the justice system.56 In cases where images are obtained by 
hacking into the computer accounts of victims, by anonymous perpetrators 
who may or may not be in Australia, Australian law may not be effective  
at all. Finally, once images have been publicly posted online, actions  
against individuals are not likely to be effective at preventing their  
ongoing distribution. 
B  Addressing Distribution Online 
One of the core limitations of existing law is that there are few remedies once 
intimate images have already been posted online. In this article, we focus on 
the issues that specifically lay around the enrolment of online intermediaries 
in the regulation of the non-consensual dissemination of intimate images. 
Like many other areas of internet regulation, removing images hosted publicly 
 
 52 Salter and Crofts, above n 1, 239. 
 53 There are few reported cases against people who deliberately and maliciously upload, or 
threaten to upload, sexually explicit imagery: see Michael Salter, Thomas Crofts and Murray 
Lee, ‘Beyond Criminalisation and Responsibilisation: Sexting, Gender and Young People’ 
(2012) 24 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 301, 311. 
 54 See Citron and Franks, above n 12, 358. 
 55 Kim, above n 14, 1008. 
 56 Domestic Violence Legal Service and the North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency, 
Submission No 120 to Australian Law Reform Commission, Inquiry into Serious Invasions of 
Privacy in the Digital Era, May 2014, 7. 
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online is extremely difficult. Even if a cause of action exists against the person 
who is initially responsible for leaking the imagery, the harm caused by  
leaked images is intensified and repeated by their continual distribution by 
third parties.57 
The Senate LACARC, led by Senator Glenn Lazarus, canvassed a number 
of different approaches to target online service providers.58 Options ranged 
from a liability scheme that imposes notice and takedown requirements, to 
opening a cooperative, formal channel of communication with telecommuni-
cations firms to ‘regularly engage on issues related to non-consensual sharing 
of intimate images’.59 The report, however, did not provide clear guidance 
about how these types of regulation might operate and representatives of the 
telecommunications industry did not strongly engage with the inquiry on 
these issues.60 In this article, we consider the range of different obligations that 
may apply to online intermediaries, with a view to identifying how effective 
regulation may be developed. 
II   R E Q U I R I N G  IN T E R M E D IA R I E S  T O  DO  MO R E :   
R E V I E W I N G  T H E  OP T IO N S  
If victims of leaked intimate media are to have an effective remedy, the 
intermediaries who host, index and make available content are the most 
effective points of control. These telecommunications providers, search 
engines, social media platforms and network hosts are the focal points of the 
internet and present the most efficient means of policing content available.61 
While it is generally not possible to completely eradicate material that has 
been posted online,62 it is possible to mitigate the harm by reducing its 
visibility. Effectively, this means ensuring that intimate images do not promi-
nently feature in search results for a victim’s name, ensuring that the material 
is not spread within the most popular or relevant social networks and, as far 
 
 57 Bambauer, above n 4, 2029. 
 58 Revenge Porn Senate Report, above n 9, 53–4 [5.24]–[5.30]. 
 59 Ibid 53 [5.26]. 
 60 Note, however, that some of the major international online service providers did make 
submissions to the inquiry: see Digital Industry Group, Submission No 14 to Senate Legal 
and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, Inquiry into Phenomenon Colloquially 
Referred to as ‘Revenge Porn’, 14 January 2016. 
 61 See generally Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a 
Borderless World (Oxford University Press, 2006) 70. 
 62 Citron and Franks, above n 12, 360. 
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as possible, attempting to regulate the most influential sites that host and 
distribute content online. 
Historically, online intermediaries have presented themselves as neutral 
platforms for communications and have largely been shielded from legal 
responsibility regarding content shared via their platforms.63 Particularly in 
the US, where most major western social networks and search engines are 
based, they enjoy almost complete immunity from liability for content posted 
by their users.64 
Victims are disempowered through liberal narratives of personal responsi-
bility and conservative values around sexuality, which all too often work 
together to reinforce a significant degree of victim blaming. The practice of 
taking intimate images itself is often constructed as either naivety65 or an 
implicit individual moral lapse on the part of the subject, and policy responses 
to panics over sexting, particularly aimed at young people, have been focused 
almost exclusively on abstinence.66 The problem is further compounded by a 
deep gender imbalance that blames victims: women who take intimate 
photos, by themselves or with their sexual partners, are derided as promiscu-
ous,67 while men are more often able to escape moral condemnation and may 
even be celebrated for their sexual prowess.68 Traditional liberal conceptions 
of privacy play strongly into this theme of individual responsibility — the 
common refrain is that if people do not want intimate images circulated, they 
should not take them at all, should not store them on insecure personal 
computers or on cloud storage providers, and should certainly not send them 
to others.69 
 
 63 Tarleton Gillespie, ‘The Politics of “Platforms”’ (2010) 12(3) New Media and Society 347, 356. 
 64 See, eg, Communications Decency Act, 47 USC § 230(c) (1996) (‘CDA’). Notably, this does not 
extend to intellectual property, where online service providers have a more limited safe 
harbour that includes obligations to remove infringing content: Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act, 17 USC § 512 (1998) (‘DMCA’). 
 65 Henry and Powell, above n 17, 105. 
 66 Kath Albury, Amy Adele Hasinoff and Theresa Senft, ‘From Media Abstinence to Media 
Production: Sexting, Young People and Education’ in Louisa Allen and Mary Lou Rasmussen 
(eds), The Palgrave Handbook of Sexuality Education (Palgrave McMillan, 2016) 527. 
 67 Salter and Crofts, above n 1, 233–4. 
 68 Citron and Franks, above n 12, 353 note that ‘women would be seen as immoral sluts for 
engaging in sexual activity, whereas men’s sexual activity is generally a point of pride.’ 
 69 Laurel O’Connor, ‘Celebrity Nude Photo Leak: Just One More Reminder  
that Privacy Does Not Exist and Legally, There’s Not Much We Can Do  
about It’ on Golden Gate University Law Review Blog (21 October 2014) 
<http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1030&context=ggu_law_re
view_blog>. 
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This victim blaming narrative is exceedingly harmful. It results in a com-
mon view that ‘women who take such risks are personally responsible for any 
harms that subsequently befall them.’70 This view severely understates the 
extent to which the harms presented by the non-consensual leaking of 
intimate images are rooted in gender inequality. Victims of this type of abuse 
are disproportionately women and girls;71 when men are targets, they are 
rarely abused and humiliated in the same way that women often experience.72 
The victim blaming narrative shifts responsibility to the subject, rather than 
those who distribute it without consent. Not only does this view disregard the 
reality of strong societal pressures on women to share intimate images with 
their partners,73 and the benefits of healthy, consensual sexting,74 but it also 
‘overlooks the spontaneous and embodied dimensions of sexual practice that 
do not lend themselves to calculative rationality’.75 
There are encouraging signs that this typical response is changing. Indeed, 
one of the most important consequences of the 2014 hacking of celebrity nude 
photos stored privately in Apple iCloud76 was the way that actress Jennifer 
Lawrence’s outrage reverberated through mainstream media and the public 
consciousness. Speaking of the attack that compromised her iCloud account, 
Lawrence told Vanity Fair: ‘It is not a scandal. It is a sex crime. It is  
a sexual violation. It’s disgusting. The law needs to be changed, and we need  
to change.’77 
Albury, Hasinoff and Senft argue that the iCloud leak triggered a shift in 
the debate, where ‘[t]he practice of taking naked pictures was discussed not as 
a shameful and implicitly individualized moral lapse, but in the broader social 
 
 70 Salter and Crofts, above n 1, 236. 
 71 Danielle Keats Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace (Harvard University Press, 2014) 13. 
 72 The phenomenon we are dealing with here is inherently gendered. Certainly, men can and 
are the victims of these types of attacks. But men are much less frequently targeted and 
prevalent heteronormative views mean that cisgendered heterosexual men are much less 
likely to suffer serious shaming as a result: see Citron and Franks, above n 12, 353–4. 
 73 Henry and Powell, above n 17, 107. 
 74 Bambauer, above n 4, 2033. 
 75 Salter and Crofts, above n 1, 236. 
 76 Thomas Fox-Brewster, ‘Stealing Nude Pics from iCloud Requires Zero Hacking Skills: Just 
Some YouTube Guides’, Forbes (online), 16 March 2016 
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2016/03/16/icloud-hacking-jennifer-
lawrence-fappening-apple-nude-photo-leaks/#20318bab75b3>. 
 77 Sam Kashner, ‘Both Huntress and Prey’, Vanity Fair (online), November 2014 
<http://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2014/10/jennifer-lawrence-photo-hacking-privacy>. 
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and political context of digital privacy and security.’78 This shift introduces a 
new debate about the ethical responsibilities of cloud service providers who 
store user images, as well as the search engines and the media platforms that 
make content accessible.79 
Mapping the bounds of the responsibility of platforms is a complex and 
deeply contested task. There are good policy reasons to insulate intermediar-
ies from liability for the actions of their users and to ensure that the regulatory 
burden they face is not excessive. The Manila Principles on Intermediary 
Liability (‘Manila Principles’) released in 2015 set out a strong argument for 
ensuring that any regulation strikes a proportionate balance between enforc-
ing law online, protecting individual rights of freedom of expression and 
promoting investment and innovation in telecommunications technologies.80 
In substantive terms, these principles reflect three core concerns around 
imposing duties on intermediaries: private entities are not well suited to 
determining whether content is unlawful or not;81 the costs of actively 
monitoring the flow of internet traffic on a massive scale are prohibitive; and 
the presumption that liability should generally attach to wrongdoing if it is to 
provide an appropriate standard to guide behaviour.82 This is a point clearly 
restated by the United Nations (‘UN’) Special Rapporteur on the promotion 
and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, who asserts 
 
 78 Albury, Hasinoff and Senft, above n 66, 539. 
 79 See generally Farhad Manjoo, ‘Taking a Naked Selfie? Your Phone Should Step in  
to Protect You’ on New York Times, Bits (5 September 2014) 
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Us Avoid Selfie Sabotage’, Forbes (online), 10 September 2014 
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/privacynotice/2014/09/10/why-smart-phones-should-help-us-
avoid-selfie-sabotage/>. 
 80 Electronic Frontier Foundation et al, Manila Principles on Intermediary Liability (2015) 
<https://www.eff.org/files/2015/10/31/manila_principles_1.0.pdf> (‘Manila Principles’). 
 81 Frank La Rue, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, 17th sess, Agenda Item 3, UN Doc A/HRC/17/27 (16 May 
2011) 12 [42] (‘2011 Report of the Special Rapporteur’). See also Nicolas Suzor and Brian 
Fitzgerald, ‘The Legitimacy of Graduated Response Schemes in Copyright Law’ (2011) 34 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 1, 25–7. 
 82 See Jane Stapleton, ‘Duty of Care: Peripheral Parties and Alternative Opportunities for 
Deterrence’ (1995) 111 Law Quarterly Review 301, 317. If the objects of the law are to change 
the behaviour of intermediaries, it may be better to develop specific standards and penalties 
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doing of others that they did not control: Kylie Pappalardo, ‘Duty and Control in Intermedi-
ary Copyright Liability: An Australian Perspective’ (2014) 4 IP Theory 9, 11. 
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that ‘intermediaries should never be held liable for content of which they are 
not the authors.’83 
It is crucial, when evaluating potential policy responses, to avoid adopting 
overly simplistic models of regulating intermediaries. This is something that 
happens relatively regularly in policy debates for the regulation of internet 
content. Policymakers often point to the fact that major intermediaries have 
implemented successful and speedy schemes to address some forms of 
criminal content on their networks. The most powerful example is that of 
child sexual abuse material,84 and this example is sometimes used to suggest 
that online intermediaries could easily extend their content regulation 
practices into other domains, such as more actively monitoring the distribu-
tion of intimate images.85 This, we suggest, is a serious mistake in analogy. The 
vast majority of sexually explicit imagery distributed on the internet is likely 
to be wholly legal. By contrast, the specific category of child sexual abuse 
material is one of the only categories of content where both possession and 
distribution are criminalised almost everywhere.86 For this category, there can 
be no acceptable countervailing interests in removing access to the material, 
and the risk of over-blocking ‘false positives’ is likely to be exceedingly low. 
Even then, there are operational difficulties, jurisdictional differences, and 
definitional grey areas in assessing the legality of content, including the 
apparent age of subjects nearing the age of consent and the fictional depiction 
of sexualised children. Calls for online intermediaries to adopt similar 
processes to deal with the non-consensual dissemination of intimate images, 
while well-intentioned, are likely to be overly simplistic.87 Unlike sexual 
material that clearly involves children, it is not possible to identify whether 
 
 83 Frank La Rue, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, 67th sess, Agenda Item 70(b), UN Doc A/67/357  
(7 September 2012) 23 [87]. 
 84 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 474.25 creates a criminal offence where an internet service 
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 85 See, eg, Select Committee on Communications, Social Media and Criminal Offences Inquiry, 
House of Lords Paper No 37, Session 2014–15 (2014) [84]. 
 86 See generally Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 91H; Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) ss 228C–228D; 
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 63–63A; Protection of Children Act 1978 (UK)  
c 37, s 1. 
 87 On the difficulties of developing acceptable lists of prohibited content to be removed or 
blocked by internet intermediaries, see generally TJ McIntyre, ‘Child Abuse Images and 
Cleanfeeds: Assessing Internet Blocking Systems’ in Ian Brown (ed), Research Handbook on 
Governance of the Internet (Edward Elgar, 2012) 277, 291–5; Karel Demeyer, Eva Lievens and 
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explicit images of adults were posted with consent from a cursory examina-
tion. The cost of actively monitoring content is likely to be prohibitive in 
many cases, and any notice-based scheme needs to be carefully crafted to 
ensure that the obligations it creates are workable.88 
This is not to say that intermediaries should have no moral responsibility 
or legal obligation to deal with the non-consensual distribution of intimate 
imagery on their networks. To date, victims who have sought to have content 
or links to content removed by online intermediaries have generally encoun-
tered serious difficulties.89 This is slowly changing; many of the major search 
engines and social networks have developed voluntary schemes to respond to 
complaints specifically in this area, which we turn to in Part III. 
Before then, however, we consider the legal options available to Australian 
jurisdictions to require intermediaries to take action. In this context, Austral-
ia’s relative power is very much constrained; unless the site is hosted in 
Australia or operated by Australians, jurisdictional problems make any form 
of legal enforcement extremely difficult. In Part II, we consider each of the 
major options that have been proposed for Australia to pursue enrolment of 
online service providers in this regulatory project. 
There are a number of different options that may be available to change the 
law to require intermediaries to assist in removing non-consensually posted 
intimate images or links to images from their networks. Any attempt to 
require intermediaries to remove content or links to content posted by third 
parties must be evaluated on both effectiveness and cost. By effectiveness, we 
mean primarily the alacrity with which content is removed and the effect that 
removal has on the accessibility of the content. By costs, we mean not just 
financial overheads (although these are important), but also the social costs to 
freedom of expression. In many cases, these are zero-sum trade-offs: the faster 
and more effective the system, the more likely it is to catch content that users 
have legitimate rights in posting and accessing (‘false positives’). Conversely, 
greater levels of due process almost inevitably mean slower, costlier and less 
effective processes. 
 
 88 See, eg, Manila Principles, above n 80, 2 warning against imposing obligations on online 
service providers to proactively monitor content or to hold them legally responsible for 
content posted by others without carefully designed protections. 
 89 See Sarah Bloom, ‘No Vengeance for “Revenge Porn” Victims: Unraveling Why this Latest 
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(2014) 42 Fordham Urban Law Journal 233, 252–5. 
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This is a classic problem of proportionality balancing.90 Whether or not 
content should be removed from a platform involves the reconciliation of two 
fundamental human rights: freedom of expression91 and the right to privacy.92 
Both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provide that everyone has the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression.93 This includes the right to express an 
opinion through speech, writing, art or any other form and the right to seek 
out and receive the expressions of others, and it protects expression that ‘may 
be regarded as deeply offensive’.94 However, in certain circumstances, these 
rights can be legitimately limited, provided three conditions are met. First, the 
restriction must be provided for by law.95 Second, it must be necessary for the 
‘respect of the rights or reputations of others’, ‘national security’, ‘public order’ 
or ‘public health or morals’.96 Third, it must meet the ‘strict tests of necessity 
and proportionality.’97 Necessity requires that the objective could not be met 
in a way that does not restrict the right to freedom of expression.98 Propor-
tionality requires that restrictions are ‘appropriate to achieve their protective 
function’ and ‘proportionate to the interest to be protected.’99 Here, as the 
dissemination of intimate images without consent likely constitutes a breach 
of the right to privacy for victims, an appropriate limitation can be said to be 
necessary for the ‘respect of the rights and reputations of others’.100 There are 
 
 90 See especially Grant Huscroft, Bradley W Miller and Grégoire Webber (eds), Proportionality 
and the Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning (Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
 91 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 
999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 19 (‘ICCPR’). 
 92 Ibid art 17; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 
183rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948) art 19 (‘UDHR’). 
 93 ICCPR art 19; UDHR, UN Doc A/810, art 19. 
 94 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 34: Article 19 — Freedoms of Opinion and 
Expression, 102nd sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 (12 September 2011) 3 [11] (‘General Com-
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 95 ICCPR art 19(3). 
 96 Ibid. 
 97 General Comment No 34, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34, 6 [22]. 
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Movement (Article 12), 67th sess, 1783rd mtg, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (1 November 
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 99 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 27: Freedom of Movement (Article 12),  
67th sess, 1783rd mtg, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (1 November 1999) 4 [14]. 
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few countervailing speech interests — there is no general public interest in 
sharing or accessing intimate media of people taken or distributed without 
their consent, even for public figures.101 However, whether any specific 
measure taken to protect these rights meets the test of proportionality 
requires further evaluation. 
Poorly designed regulatory schemes raise the serious risk that those inter-
mediaries that are unable to avoid potential liability altogether will instead 
adopt risk-averse policies that err on the side of caution, resulting in a 
significant chilling effect on legitimate speech.102 Below, we evaluate three 
recent developments: the European Union’s ‘Right to Be Forgotten’; the 
ALRC’s proposal for a tort of serious invasion of privacy; and a suggested 
tweak to copyright law that would allow victims to seek redress under the 
well-established notice and takedown scheme in the US’ Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, 17 USC (1998) (‘DMCA’).103 
A  The ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ and the Regulation of Search Engines 
In 2013, the European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) ruled that individuals could 
request major internet search engines to remove links to personal information 
that is inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant or excessive.104 Dubbed the ‘Right to 
Be Forgotten’ (‘RTBF’), the ECJ’s ruling reflects a stark ideological divide 
across the Atlantic over the appropriate balance between privacy and speech 
interests,105 as well as amongst those who worry about the costs to telecom-
munications companies and flow-on effects for investment in innovation.106 
The RTBF obligation could extend to links to intimate images posted with-
out consent.107 Targeting search engines provides some redress for victims 
 
 101 Cf Barker, above n 4. 
 102 2011 Report of the Special Rapporteur, UN Doc A/HRC/17/27, 12 [40]. 
 103 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 USC § 512 (1998). 
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whose images are posted on sites that are unresponsive to takedown requests. 
It does not remove the content from the open web, but it can significantly 
limit the harm that flows from the appearance of intimate images in  
search results.108 
The costs of the RTBF are, however, quite substantial. The ECJ decision 
requires search providers to balance rights of privacy with freedom of 
expression.109 Major search engines Google and Bing have implemented a web 
form to allow people to request removal of a particular URL from their 
index.110 These URLs are manually reviewed, and so far Google has approved 
43 per cent of requests.111 Even if these costs are reasonable for a giant search 
engine like Google, they may operate to keep smaller entrants out of  
the market. 
Successfully removing links under the RTBF to non-consensually upload-
ed explicit media is likely to go some way to restoring a victim’s right to 
privacy. A great deal of the harm suffered by victims lies in the knowledge that 
their intimate images are easily discoverable by their personal and profession-
al contacts who enter their name in a search query.112 This is a classic case of 
context collapse: victims lose control over how they present themselves to 
different audiences.113 The RTBF, in effecting the removing the links, stops 
one aspect of the ongoing violation. However, it is difficult to say with 
conviction whether the RTBF meets the test of proportionality. A complete 
evaluation would require more rigorous empirical analysis of how decisions 
are made by search engines,114 with a focus on identifying (with some 
precision) the ultimate costs to freedom of speech. Currently, decisions by 
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intermediaries are made in a very opaque manner;115 it is accordingly 
exceedingly difficult to be sure how well private decision-makers are able to 
balance competing concerns and evaluate factual questions.116 Given the risk 
of limiting access to legitimate speech, this system may not be the most 
appropriate means to protect an individual’s right to privacy. 
The question of whether the RTBF is a proportionate measure is deeply 
contested. Clearly, the ECJ found the measure to be justified, explaining that 
the fundamental rights under arts 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union ‘override, as a rule, not only the economic 
interest of the operator of the search engine but also the interest of the general 
public in finding that information upon a search relating to the data subject’s 
name.’117 Google resisted the move initially, but has since cooperated by 
adding a simple request form for users.118 It publishes regular statistics 
showing the number of requests it receives — over 700 000 requests com-
plaining of nearly 2 million URLs to date.119 Google only recently agreed  
to implement its result filtering on all of its search domains for European 
users — previously, RTBF requests were only blocked on localised search 
portals, not on Google itself.120 
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Academic opinion differs too — often along a familiar US/European Un-
ion divide.121 For those who care primarily about freedom of speech, the ECJ’s 
decision appears to be a direct threat to free speech and an unjustifiable 
imposition on a private actor to adjudicate on complex matters of law and 
fact.122 To those who care deeply about substantive protections for privacy, the 
decision is largely regarded as a positive intervention by the European 
Union.123 Much of the conflict centres around the difficulty that private 
organisations have in evaluating whether a particular piece of information is 
‘relevant’ and the concomitant risk that information which rightfully belongs 
in the public domain is able to be purged on request.124 
The main questions, then, are around the burden on intermediaries and 
the risk of false positives in cases where either the complainant is not in fact 
the person depicted or has previously consented to the widespread distribu-
tion of the images. The relative weight of these costs of compliance is, while 
not insignificant, probably relatively small as long as the volume of requests 
remains low. The major search engines are already expending these costs, 
although it is possible that smaller entities may be disproportionately disad-
vantaged. The risks of false positives or fraudulent requests are also likely to 
be relatively small, although there is no available data for this. On the whole, a 
strong argument can be made for an RTBF-style obligation that addresses the 
non-consensual sharing of intimate images. In order to ensure that decisions 
are made transparently and according to acceptable criteria, however, any 
such obligation would be strengthened by a legitimate court process,125 or at 
least a streamlined administrative process that provides the potential for 
direct judicial oversight. As we will see in Part III, however, given that most 
major search engines are already responding to requests to remove unwanted 
information, the utility of introducing formal legislation is likely to be very 
low and maybe even counterproductive. 
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B  Civil and Criminal Liability for Online Intermediaries 
Apart from search engines, the other major set of online intermediaries that 
play a key role in disseminating intimate images are content hosts. These are 
the discussion forums, social media platforms and image and video sites that 
store content uploaded by users and make it accessible online. When attackers 
leaked celebrity photos taken from iCloud, or posted the archive of Snapchat 
photos obtained by compromising snapsaved.com, large discussion board 
sites like Reddit were the primary places for people to post and seek links to 
the images.126 Other platforms — like the notorious Is Anyone Up?, where the 
term ‘revenge porn’ became popularised — specifically solicited submissions 
of intimate images without the consent of the subjects.127 
The straightforward legislative response to deal with content posted on the 
internet in cases where it is too difficult or too late to target the individual 
responsible for posting it is to seek to shift liability to the hosts of the content. 
These are often the organisations that are the ‘least cost avoiders’ — they are 
the most efficient points of control to limit the further dissemination of 
content.128 In recommending the introduction of an Australian tort of serious 
invasion of privacy,129 the ALRC suggested that intermediaries may also be 
liable under the tort.130 
The operative test of the ALRC’s proposed privacy tort is that a person 
intentionally or recklessly commits a serious invasion of the privacy of 
another by, inter alia, disseminating their private information.131 Clearly, 
distributing private nude or sexual images of another person, without their 
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consent, would constitute a serious invasion of privacy. It would also be 
effective against Australian online service providers who actively solicit others 
to leak images. How exactly the ALRC’s proposed tort would apply to general-
purpose online intermediaries (ie, search engines, content hosts and social 
networks), however, is as yet unclear. 
Normally, the operator of a general-purpose intermediary would not have the 
requisite mental element (intention or recklessness) to satisfy the tort.132 
Importantly, the ALRC notes that a court may find an intermediary to have 
‘intended an invasion of privacy, or been reckless, if they know that their 
service has been used to invade someone’s privacy, and they are reasonably 
able to stop the invasion of privacy, but they choose not to do so.’133 
Defamation law provides perhaps the closest analogy to intermediary 
liability under a potential new tort of serious invasion of privacy. Under 
defamation, an intermediary is liable where they ‘publish’ defamatory 
imputations134 — which may include, in the case of search engines and 
content hosts, continuing to make content posted by third parties available 
once it has been brought to their attention.135 In its report, the ALRC implied 
that ‘publish’ may be a broader verb than ‘invade’, but also cited defamation 
authority for the proposition that knowledge might condition liability.136 
The ALRC did not recommend the introduction of a ‘safe harbour’ 
scheme,137 with the implication that an intermediary could be culpable ‘if they 
know that their service has been used to invade someone’s privacy, and they 
are reasonably able to stop the invasion of privacy, but they choose not to do 
so.’138 Conceivably, then, the operation of the proposed tort would provide a 
victim within Australia with a legal mechanism to require online intermediar-
ies to remove content and potentially even links to content posted by third 
parties. How far such an obligation may stretch is a matter of some debate. An 
ongoing case in Northern Ireland is proceeding to trial on the claim that 
Facebook ought to have acted expeditiously in removing images of a naked 14 
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year old girl that were reposted multiple times139 — what copyright owners 
have controversially been seeking as a ‘notice and staydown’ obligation.140 
In practice, however, the extent of intermediary liability under a new pri-
vacy tort may be too ill-defined to be an appropriate or proportionate 
response. It may encourage Australian intermediaries to comply quickly, but it 
is also likely to add to a concerning series of laws that introduce uncertainty 
in online hosting. First, the imposition of liability at this level will fall short of 
covering the major foreign intermediaries that host potentially harmful 
content. Many of the biggest content hosts are based in the US, where they 
benefit from ‘safe harbour’ legislation that provides immunity from almost all 
potential legal consequences that flow from the actions of their users, even for 
content that they encourage people to post and refuse to remove.141 This is not 
the case in Australia,142 and there is a risk that ill-defined limitations on 
liability may encourage Australian service providers to seek more favourable 
rules in other jurisdictions and discourage investment in Australian internet 
services. In terms of protections for speech, there is also a concern that 
conditioning liability upon knowledge creates a strong incentive for interme-
diaries to remove content upon receiving an allegation, regardless of its 
veracity. The recent cases extending liability in defamation law in Australia to 
search engine intermediaries are deeply controversial,143 and there are serious 
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concerns about the spillover effects on speech interests. Intermediaries have 
few incentives to seek to validate that allegations are correctly made and are 
therefore likely to systematically over-block legitimate speech. It is for this 
reason that guidelines like the Manila Principles strongly recommend that 
intermediaries be shielded from general liability, and that if an obligation to 
remove speech is to be imposed, it be done through a notice and takedown 
scheme that adequately protects due process and speech rights  
(discussed below).144 
If a civil liability scheme for intermediaries is unlikely to be justifiable, a 
criminal offence is even more problematic. As discussed earlier, in September 
2015, federal opposition MPs Terri Butler and Tim Watts introduced the 
Criminal Code Amendment (Private Sexual Material) Bill 2015 (Cth) into the 
House of Representatives. The Bill, now lapsed, would have created new 
offences for distributing, threatening to distribute and preparing to distribute 
private sexual material over the internet or telephone network without the 
consent of the person depicted. As drafted, the Bill presented worrying 
uncertainty for online intermediaries. 
Culpability under the proposed offence arises when a ‘person transmits, 
makes available, publishes, distributes, advertises or promotes material’.145 
The required mental element is intention to distribute, which, within the 
broad language of the offence, would presumably be able to be proved beyond 
reasonable doubt in proceedings against an operator like Hunter Moore (the 
operator of Is Anyone Up?). Worryingly, however, it is not clear that a general-
purpose intermediary would be immune from criminal responsibility under 
this draft. The words ‘transmit’, ‘make available’, ‘publish’ and ‘distribute’ are 
used but not defined within the Bill. Without more careful drafting, these 
terms could conceivably be sufficiently broad to catch content hosts, social 
networks and even search engines that host and link to private sexual material 
posted by third parties. While the operators of a general purpose intermediary 
would generally lack the requisite intent to be convicted under this proposed 
offence, it is not clear whether a court may impute intention in circumstances 
where the intermediary becomes aware of private sexual content (or links to 
private sexual content) on their network and fails to take action to remove it 
within a reasonable period. 
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Without greater clarification, civil or criminal liability for hosting or dis-
tributing content uploaded by a third party is likely to be insufficiently 
tailored to pass a proportionality analysis. In most cases, rather than holding 
intermediaries directly liable for the actions of others that they fail to redress, 
it is more appropriate to develop clear procedures for illicit content to be 
removed — such as the notice and takedown procedures developed under 
copyright law. 
C  A Copyright-Based Notice and Takedown Scheme 
The notice and takedown procedures for copyright, originally developed as 
part of the US’ DMCA and later exported around the world,146 are designed 
specifically to provide certainty to service providers about their potential 
liability for content posted or disseminated by others. Online service provid-
ers are granted immunity from suit in exchange for following a detailed 
procedure for the removal of content (or links to content) that is allegedly 
infringing copyright.147 While the system has certainly been the subject of 
abuse,148 and is showing signs of strain under a flood of incoming notices,149 it 
is largely effective at providing the certainty that intermediaries require when 
removing content. 
The success, in pragmatic terms, of copyright notice and takedown has led 
some commentators, including Professor Derek Bambauer, to suggest that it 
might provide an effective mechanism for victims of ‘revenge porn’ to curtail 
the spread of their images.150 Under current law, victims are typically not able 
to use copyright remedies because they are often not the owner of copyright 
in images or videos recorded by another person (selfies, of course, are the 
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exception here).151 Bambauer suggests a tweak to copyright law that would 
grant the subjects of ‘intimate media’152 a copyright interest, enabling them to 
sue for damages and, most importantly, make use of the notice and takedown 
procedures available to copyright owners.153 
Such a tweak to Australian law might enable Australians to impose legal 
obligations on intermediaries normally beyond the effective reach of domestic 
laws. It appears that this can be achieved without any change to US law. 
Historically, conflict of laws issues under the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Artistic and Literary Works’ principle of national treatment154 
have often been resolved in a manner that subjects all issues of copyright in an 
international dispute to the jurisdiction of the protecting country.155 In 1998, 
however, the US Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Itar-Tass Russian News 
Agency v Russian Kurier Inc reasoned that the scope of national treatment 
only applies to substantive copyright protection and does not extend to 
ownership.156 The current view, accepted in later decisions in other circuits, 
appears to be that ownership should be properly determined by the originat-
ing country.157 What this means, effectively, is that if Australian law were to 
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grant subjects of intimate media an ownership interest, they would likely have 
title to sue, even though US law would not normally recognise such an 
interest. This would in turn allow Australian victims to utilise the DMCA 
takedown mechanism — a particularly useful remedy for large US-based 
content hosts and search engines. 
Ultimately, Bambauer’s suggestion involves a relatively large change to 
copyright principles for a small subset of copyright works. It would require 
the copyright owners of media that is sexually explicit or shows nudity to 
obtain the consent of subjects before distributing or displaying the media. In 
practice, extending joint authorship rights to the subjects of intimate media 
would allow victims to utilise the take down mechanisms of the DMCA. The 
primary concern with Bambauer’s suggestion, at least from the perspective of 
common law countries, is that it repudiates the general principle that subjects 
are not entitled to copyright protection, which is crucial to the freedom of 
photographers and filmmakers to be able to capture social life.158 Extending 
authorship to subjects of media may result in an impractical increase in the 
amount of people with interests in copyright works. This may lead to a 
‘tragedy of the anticommons’ where the excessive number of rights to exclude 
undermines the efficiency of the system.159 Transferring and managing rights 
could become increasingly complex in a large creative work involving many 
authors, and there is no clear mechanism to resolve conflicting claims by joint 
authors.160 Copyright law already poses significant problems for distributors 
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and re-users of film footage who need to trace long chains of contractual 
agreements to identify and obtain licences from all potential copyright 
owners,161 and policymakers should be wary of exacerbating this problem. 
These concerns may be alleviated in part through careful drafting. An 
integral part of Bambauer’s proposal involves only extending joint authorship 
to subjects of media that are portrayed in situations of graphic nudity.162 This 
much more limited grant of interests would mean that the number of situa-
tions in which contractual consent from subjects is required would be 
relatively few. The adult film industry is the main area in which Bambauer’s 
proposal would require significant changes in practice.163 Some commentators 
suggest that requiring explicit consent in these cases, however, may actually be 
an important and welcome change; given that the abuse and exploitation 
faced by performers in the adult film industry has been well documented.164 
Extending authorship rights to performers may help to curb this problem. 
While such a system would still require careful balance to avoid the pitfalls 
described above, such an imposition can be more readily justified where it is 
necessary to avoid the exploitation of vulnerable individuals.165 
We suggest that granting a carefully tailored copyright interest to subjects 
of intimate imagery would likely pass a proportionality analysis. The costs to 
legitimate speech — particularly the transaction costs of obtaining consent 
when photographing or filming people who are naked or engaged in sexual 
activity — are real but relatively limited. For victims, on the other hand, the 
ability to access a real, working mechanism to control the dissemination of 
representations of their bodies is a tangible and significant benefit to their 
privacy. At least to the extent that notice and takedown provisions are 
proportionate when exercised by copyright owners in commercial contexts, 
they are also likely to be proportionate in addressing clear invasions  
of privacy. 
Perhaps the strongest objection to Bambauer’s proposal is that it muddies 
our conception of what copyright law is for. The privacy and autonomy 
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interests it seeks to protect are orthogonal to the goals of copyright law of 
promoting the production and dissemination of expression.166 In  
Garcia v Google Inc, the Court highlighted the impropriety of using copyright 
law to control distribution for non-copyright purposes: ‘[Garcia’s] harms are 
untethered from — and incompatible with — copyright and copyright’s 
function as the engine of expression.’167 Similarly, Bambauer’s proposal 
involves a significant mismatch between the claim of authorship sought and 
what the victims are seeking to remedy.168 We suggest that legislators should 
be very wary of contributing to the use of copyright takedowns to achieve 
non-copyright ends: we know already that a large proportion of takedown 
requests are designed to stifle speech or competition.169 There is a serious risk 
that further extending the basis upon which copyright takedowns can be used 
may lead to further erosion to the identifiable core goal of copyright protec-
tion and this should generally be resisted if possible.170 
Ultimately, Bambauer’s proposal is, in technical terms, a ‘hack’, or perhaps 
a ‘kludge’: it is a relatively inelegant solution. By piggybacking on the widely 
implemented DMCA takedown process and appropriating the strong reme-
dies of copyright damages, it may well be the most effective way to provide a 
real avenue for victims to convince the bulk of online intermediaries to assist 
in reducing the spread of intimate media. Certainly, the proposal would 
render an already complex body of law even more complex. In practical 
terms, however, it must also be noted that copyright law has already been 
twisted and pulled in different ways to address the interests of different 
groups: the rights of performers, broadcasters and producers are all also 
‘kludges’ built on top of copyright over the last century. Copyright law has not 
developed as a pure utilitarian bargain — it is the result of a continual series 
of negotiations and compromises between established and emerging inter-
ests.171 Whether Bambauer’s proposal, if implemented, would actually make 
routine copyright practice more difficult is an open question, but there is good 
reason to think that this horse has long ago bolted. 
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We proceed with some ambivalence as to whether a copyright-based no-
tice and takedown solution is likely to be desirable. In pragmatic terms, 
creating an ownership interest for subjects of intimate media would empower 
victims with a real, effective remedy. It may also go some way to alleviating 
some of the victim blaming that stems from the perceived ‘naivety’ of women 
who agree to share intimate images without any mechanisms to control how 
those images are subsequently used. As a concrete tool for empowering 
women to take control of how representations of their bodies are distributed, 
a notice and takedown mechanism of some kind is likely desirable. It is 
certainly likely to pass a proportionality analysis. But it is always likely to be a 
second best solution; a specific legislative regime that is targeted at the abusive 
infringement of privacy fits better than shoehorning these interests into 
copyright. Given that an effective regime that binds US intermediaries is 
unlikely to be introduced in the near future, however, the proposal has 
considerable merit. Below, we turn to the question of whether a voluntary 
takedown system is sufficient. If it is not, a tightly limited move to grant an 
ownership interest to subjects of intimate media may well represent a simple 
and proportionate mechanism to graft a right of privacy onto existing and 
established copyright structures. 
D  An eSafety Commissioner 
We are in a period of strong demand for greater regulatory control over 
internet content, and public administrative agencies are starting to experi-
ment with different regulatory models. Both the Victorian Law Reform 
Commission (‘VLRC’) and the Commonwealth Senate LACARC inquiries 
recommended a greater role for regulators in dealing with the non-consensual 
dissemination of intimate imagery. The VLRC recommended following New 
Zealand in creating a ‘Communications Tribunal’ which could deal with 
complaints, in the hope that its authority would be recognised as legitimate by 
foreign intermediaries.172 The Senate LACARC report similarly recommended 
that the Commonwealth empower an agency to issue takedown notices, and 
that formal mechanisms be created enabling a dialogue between intermediar-
ies and the government.173 
These regulatory approaches present significant benefits over intermediary 
liability schemes on both pragmatic and proportionality grounds. Pragmati-
 
 172 Inquiry into Sexting, above n 20, 198–202. 
 173 Revenge Porn Senate Report, above n 9, 53 [5.25]–[5.26]. 
2017] Non-Consensual Porn and Online Intermediaries 1087 
cally, co-regulatory approaches developed in consultation with industry are 
less likely to expose intermediaries to unmanageable legal risks.174 They are 
therefore potentially more likely to help secure compliance from foreign firms 
and less likely to inhibit investment in digital services. From a speech perspec-
tive, the availability of a dedicated body with specialist knowledge that can 
investigate complaints and liaise directly with intermediaries could signifi-
cantly improve the quality of takedown requests — reducing the risks of 
deliberate or inadvertent abuse of notice and takedown systems.175 While an 
administrative body does not have the legitimacy of a court in determining 
that content is unlawful, it may strike an appropriate balance between due 
process and the need for fast, cheap solutions. Formally, as long as decisions 
are enforceable and reviewable under the supervision of an appropriate court, 
the risks are minimal.176 
Substantively, it is conceivable that a well-resourced independent adminis-
trative body could come to decisions about whether content should be 
removed in a way that is more legitimate than, as in the RTBF case, requiring 
private platforms to weigh public interest concerns. Reasonable opinions 
differ here — from a strict liberal freedom of speech perspective, private 
platforms are fully entitled to make decisions on content and the interference 
of the state, particularly the executive, must be viewed with deep suspicion. 
But if these co-regulatory approaches explored are implemented with legiti-
mate due process mechanisms and transparent government practices, these 
measures are likely to meet the test of proportionality. 
The key difficulty, of course, lies in designing a system that is both afforda-
ble and effective. Administrative processes are typically more expensive and 
slow than would be required to effectively address non-consensual pornogra-
phy — where the need to remove content promptly, before it spreads uncon-
trollably, is absolutely vital. A tribunal system that processes and adjudicates 
complaints is unlikely to be workable at any real scale, and there is little 
political will to fund regulators to the extent that they need to routinely 
enforce the law. 
Short of a legal requirement to compel online intermediaries to remove 
content or links to content, regulators are beginning to experiment with new 
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co-regulatory approaches. Given the jurisdictional limits of regulating the 
actions of foreign telecommunications firms, there is increasing interest in 
‘adaptive regulation’, where regulators ‘tinker’ with ‘inputs, connectivity, 
incentives, and feedback’177 to encourage firms to act in ways that further the 
public good. 
The recent Australian development of the Office of the Children’s eSafety 
Commissioner (‘OCeSC’) is a prime example of a regulator’s keen under-
standing of the limits of legal authority. The OCeSC is tasked with administer-
ing a complaints system for online bullying material targeted at Australian 
children.178 While the OCeSC has legal enforcement powers, these are only 
realistically effective against Australian intermediaries, not the major foreign 
social media platforms. Core to the OCeSC’s operation is a voluntary scheme 
designed to encourage social media platforms to cooperate by developing 
procedures for the rapid removal of bullying content.179 The scheme’s viability 
relies, to a large extent, on the ability of the OCeSC to engage in direct 
communication and in public messaging180 to encourage platforms to 
participate as good corporate citizens. The scheme was only recently intro-
duced — its effectiveness to this end remains to be seen, although early 
indications are promising. The Federal government has recently announced 
that the Office would be renamed to the ‘Office of the eSafety Commissioner’, 
reflecting a broader remit to address harmful online content.181 News reports 
suggest that the Office has received over 350 complaints about the non-
consensual distribution of intimate images in 2016–17, and it appears to have 
had at least some success in communicating concerns about these complaints 
with the major social media platforms.182 
New Zealand is currently experimenting with a similar approach. New 
Zealand has enacted the Harmful Digital Communications Act 2015 (NZ), 
which is designed to ‘deter, prevent, and mitigate harm caused to individuals 
by digital communications’ and ‘provide victims of harmful digital communi-
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cations with a quick and efficient means of redress.’183 The Act encompasses a 
broad range of harmful speech, and would certainly extend to cover the non-
consensual distribution of intimate media. The Act creates an agency empow-
ered to receive, investigate and resolve complaints.184 It also provides for the 
making of orders in relation to harmful material, including that it be taken 
down by a defendant and an online content host.185 Again, while this New 
Zealand tribunal has some enforcement powers, it is expected to operate 
against foreign platforms through a ‘soft law’ regulatory approach that engages 
intermediaries in the ‘development of consistent, transparent, and accessible 
policies and protocols’.186 
It is too early to tell how effective these administrative approaches are 
likely to be, and more empirical research is needed to identify their limits. But 
we are cautiously optimistic that these regulatory experiments in influencing 
the operators of private networks could efficiently drive the development of 
better self-regulatory practices without the high costs of administrative 
tribunals or judicial processes. We think that an appropriate regulatory body, 
working in consultation with online intermediaries and public interest groups, 
could present an effective and efficient means to regulate the non-consensual 
dissemination of intimate images, at least on respectable and cooperative 
networks. Of course, by transferring the costs of enforcement to private 
actors, these systems risk giving up some of the legitimacy of public mecha-
nisms of enforcement — and so we expect that careful attention will have to 
be paid in the future to developing new systems of review of private decisions. 
On the whole, however, while these consultative models of governing internet 
content are still in their infancy, we think that they represent an important 
innovation in regulatory practice with real potential to address harmful 
content in a legitimate way. 
E  Liability versus Responsibility: Balancing the Right to Freedom  
of Expression and Privacy 
Laws can help to enrol intermediaries in combating abuse, but successfully 
dealing with harmful internet content ultimately requires the cooperation of 
private actors. The fact that US law provides such strong shelter from legal 
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liability means that online intermediaries faced with legal obligations they 
deem to be too onerous can, at least to some extent, escape the reach of other 
national legal systems. In order to effectively tackle the problem, strong social 
pressure on these providers will likely be as important, if not more, than new 
legal obligations. 
There are encouraging signs that many online intermediaries are begin-
ning to take the problem of abuse on their networks much more seriously. 
Over the last few years, considerable strides have been made by civil society 
groups to convince major platforms to be more responsive to harmful 
material on their networks — and these efforts have been particularly 
successful in the context of the non-consensual dissemination of intimate 
imagery. Groups like the Association for Progressive Communications, for 
example, have released influential research reports that highlight the failings 
of major intermediaries in adequately addressing violence against women 
online.187 This work examined the policies of major intermediaries Facebook, 
YouTube and Twitter and found that all three lack transparency around re-
posting and redress processes and that they have no public commitment to 
human rights standards, other than the encouragement of free speech.188 
When confronted with challenging questions, these platforms have ‘erred on 
the side of unrestrained expression, often to women’s detriment’.189 The 
intermediaries studied at the time demonstrated a ‘reluctance to engage 
directly with technology-related violence against women, until it becomes a 
public relations issue’,190 which, according to the report, suggested:  
a lack of appreciation of the seriousness of violence against women online, 
and a lack of recognition of the responsibility of the intermediary to take 
measures to mitigate the frequency and seriousness of instances of vio-
lence, and to provide redress.191 
This work, echoed and amplified by mainstream and social media attention, 
and supported by other civil society groups and advocates, has been relatively 
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successful in bringing social pressure to bear on the massive online platforms. 
In 2013, Facebook altered their policy towards hate speech online, promising 
to do more in response to the demands of activist groups including Women, 
Action and the Media (‘WAM!’) and the Everyday Sexism Project.192 Reddit in 
2014 responded positively to the outrage and public pressure following its role 
as a central hub in the celebrity iCloud leak scandal, and subsequently 
committed to removing links to any non-consensually posted content 
reported to it.193 Google and Microsoft later moved to adopt relatively simple 
systems to respond to complaints from victims who seek to remove links to 
intimate images from search results.194 Twitter, too, has vowed to do more to 
combat abuse against women on its network — and has recently announced 
the development of a ‘Trust and Safety Council’ to work more closely with 
advocacy organisations in responding to abuse.195 
The Terms of Service (‘ToS’) of Facebook,196 Twitter,197 Reddit198 and 
Google’s revenge porn removal policy199 now all expressly disallow the non-
consensual posting of intimate imagery on their sites. Each of these interme-
diaries rely on a system of user based reporting for enforcement. Facebook 
allows users to notify operators of content which violates their ToS by clicking 
a drop-down menu on the content. Twitter has also created a detailed form 
users can fill out to report,200 whilst Reddit directs its users to contact them 
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via email.201 Google,202 Bing203 and Yahoo!204 have provided webforms for 
requests for removal of non-consensually uploaded nude or sexually explicit 
material (separately to the RTBF request webform). Both Google and Bing 
require the user to indicate whether they have ever consented to the distribu-
tion of the material — in the case of Google, a positive response here will 
result in the user being redirected away from the voluntary process to the 
more onerous legal process.205 
The willingness of these major platforms to address the non-consensual 
distribution of intimate imagery is encouraging. These policy changes reflect 
growing social pressure for online intermediaries to do more to combat abuse. 
Part of this is market-led — perhaps through demand by users and the threat 
of a mass exodus of women and minority groups from some social media 
platforms.206 There is also an increasing recognition that the non-consensual 
dissemination of illicit images, as a form of gendered hate speech that harms 
and silences women, is a human rights issue.207 Indeed, the UN has asserted 
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that businesses have a duty to act to limit the use of their products or net-
works in ways that are abusive.208 
One of the core challenges for intermediaries seeking to protect human 
rights on their platforms is the difficulty of developing processes that are both 
sufficiently responsive to abuse and sufficiently protective of freedom of 
expression. The voluntary removal processes described above are characteris-
tically opaque — the criteria against which decisions are made are not 
published and there are limited (if any) avenues for appeal.209 As the former 
UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, Frank La Rue, points out, 
the ‘lack of transparency in the intermediaries’ decision-making process … 
often obscures discriminatory practices or political pressure affecting the 
companies’ decisions.’210 The escalating costs associated with providing a 
simultaneously timely and careful decision discourage intermediaries from 
being transparent about this process. 
It is possible to reconcile the apparently conflicting demands of speech 
embodied in documents like the Manila Principles with the calls for greater 
protection for privacy interests. One example is the work of the Dynamic 
Coalition on Platform Responsibility (‘DCPR’), a component of the UN 
Internet Governance Forum, which is in the process of drafting a framework 
for contractual ToS agreements which seeks to address privacy, freedom of 
expression and due process concerns.211 The DCPR attempts to provide a 
model for best practice in the way that online intermediaries deploy adequate 
‘due diligence’ standards when evaluating complaints about content on their 
networks. The draft recommendations suggest that platforms should provide 
mechanisms for users to report content that breaches their privacy, but 
require that decisions are made in a way that is clear, predictable and impar-
tial, and that users are provided with the reasons upon which decisions are 
made and an opportunity to be heard in response.212 These principles are 
necessarily still aspirational. While they are not binding in any way, there is 
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some hope that the multi-stakeholder process through which they and other 
similar instruments are being developed will encourage intermediaries to  
do more to ensure that they govern their networks in ways that are legitimate 
and fair. 
There is still a long way to go in encouraging private online intermediaries 
to protect people from abuse on their platforms. While some of the major 
platforms have agreed to do more, there are many more providers who have 
not. It also remains to be seen how effective the promises of the major social 
network services to respond more quickly to abuse are in practice. For those 
who wish to see these intermediaries address human rights violations on their 
platforms, maintaining social pressure to do so is critical. While at least some 
private actors can be counted on to respond to market demand for safer 
online spaces, gender-based harassment is still pervasive and widely accepted 
online.213 It is accordingly not yet safe to say that legal regulation is not or will 
not be required in the immediate future. 
F  Incubating a Culture of Consent 
Most of the options canvassed in this article deal with different methods of 
responding to complaints about content. But the core problem with both legal 
notice and takedown, and ToS-based complaints procedures is that they are 
necessarily reactive policies: they do not actively stop the non-consensual 
distribution of intimate images from occurring in the first place. Necessarily, a 
policy that relies on victims to complain ‘only addresses the symptom of the 
problem, not its cause.’214 In general terms, complaints-based systems are a 
global default; few intermediaries are interested in expending the resources 
required to proactively monitor content submitted by users. The costs of 
doing so are often likely to be so prohibitive that any legal requirement  
to monitor is likely to impermissibly interfere with core freedom of  
expression rights.215 
It is also necessary to recognise the critical importance of consent in this 
context. While it is imperative that intermediaries respond to the non-
consensual distribution of intimate images, it is also important that images of 
women’s bodies uploaded with consent are not arbitrarily censored. In recent 
 
 213 Ann Bartow, ‘Internet Defamation as Profit Center: The Monetization of Online Harassment’ 
(2009) 32 Harvard Journal of Law and Gender 384, 428; Citron and Franks, above n 12, 353; 
Salter and Crofts, above n 1, 238. 
 214 Van der Nagel and Meese, above n 193. 
 215 2011 Report of the Special Rapporteur, UN Doc A/HRC/17/27, 12–13 [40]–[43]. 
2017] Non-Consensual Porn and Online Intermediaries 1095 
times, social media platforms have come under great criticism for the ways in 
which they remove consensually uploaded images of women’s bodies. 
Facebook, for example, has controversially removed images of breastfeeding 
mothers,216 Indigenous women217 and even overweight women,218 in ways that 
suggest its definitions of acceptable content reflect and entrench Western 
heteronormative views. These moves are indicative of prevailing oppressive, 
disempowering and body shaming attitudes that women face — the same 
attitudes that lead to the relentless shaming of victims when their intimate 
images are circulated by perpetrators. Addressing the abuse of women online 
will require more than responding to individual instances of abuse; a cultural 
change is required, and part of this change likely requires some work by 
platforms to ensure that ordinary women are not prevented from sharing 
their images and expression in ways that continue to reinforce toxic  
feminine ideals. 
One of the most promising examples of major platforms working to pro-
tect women from abuse comes from Reddit’s ‘Gonewild’ community. Reddit 
Gonewild is a subreddit — a derivation of Reddit with its own rules and 
moderators that takes a much more proactive approach to ensuring material is 
posted with consent.219 Reddit Gonewild exists specifically for the purpose of 
sharing intimate imagery for enjoyment in an environment which facilitates 
anonymity.220 Reddit Gonewild’s rules require that all content that is uploaded 
be done with the consent of the subject.221 To ensure this, the moderators of 
the site require users to undergo a process of ‘verification’. Before being 
permitted to post content, users must demonstrate their consent by posting 
images that clearly identify the poster’s body, along with a handwritten sign.222 
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Once a user has been verified, they are identified by a distinctive icon on their 
user profile. Moderators may require verification if they are not convinced 
that the person posting the images is in fact the subject. Users who post 
images without consent are banned, and moderators may delete content 
posted if verification is not completed sufficiently quickly.223 
The Gonewild story is interesting and insightful as a direct, community 
driven response to the problems faced by women who lose control over their 
images. By prioritising control and consent, Gonewild squarely places the 
responsibility for preventing abuse on the posters and moderators of content. 
Rather than require victims to go through the difficult process of seeking to 
have content removed, Gonewild is able to flip the burden of proof. In this 
way, Gonewild seeks to create an empowering space that enables women to 
maintain a greater degree of control over the way their images are viewed, 
without creating a stigma that delegitimises their sexuality and agency in 
choosing to share intimate images.224 In the face of frequent victim blaming, 
where women are admonished for taking or sharing intimate images in the 
first place, Gonewild’s efforts to help women regain control stand out as a 
singularly empowering move.225 
The adaptability of similar moves to combat the non-consensual distribu-
tion of sexually explicit imagery in some wider contexts is at least plausible. 
Beyond noting the stated aims and explicit policies of the subreddit, we are 
unable to guess at the effectiveness of Gonewild’s processes in practice. More 
work is likely required to better understand this and other private regulatory 
innovations to combat abuse. But it is encouraging that some fora are willing 
to experiment with options that directly prioritise consent as a core precondi-
tion for sharing of intimate imagery. Provided they are implemented in a way 
that is sufficiently transparent, accurate and not overly onerous, these proce-
dures are likely consistent with the principles of proportionality. More than 
complaints-based systems, these types of processes are likely to be able to 
positively change cultural norms, at least within relatively close-knit commu-
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nities. Policies that reinforce the importance of consent are precisely the types 
of regulatory experiments that should be encouraged in the immediate future. 
III   CO N C LU SI O N  
In this article, we have canvassed a number of different regulatory options to 
help empower people to better control how representations of their bodies are 
distributed online. In terms of a regulatory approach to address the non-
consensual dissemination of intimate imagery, we think that some of the 
current experiments in co-regulatory schemes are worth pursuing further. It 
will be important to ensure that administrative agencies are well-resourced 
and that sufficient effort is made to develop productive dialogues with both 
civil society groups and telecommunications providers to find workable but 
legitimate mechanisms to respond to complaints. These systems should also 
be used to encourage providers to do more on their own initiative to respond 
to harms perpetrated through their networks — although, again, in a legiti-
mate way. We do not think that further legal sanctions are generally  
justifiable at this stage, although some may be needed to deal with more 
recalcitrant intermediaries. 
More broadly, however, we note that there is still a long way to go to devel-
op means to address abuse online. The extent to which women and minority 
groups are disempowered and silenced through pervasive abuse in online 
networks is becoming a critical problem for internet governance more 
generally. The work to reconcile the historical commitment of telecommuni-
cations providers and many civil society organisations to strong conceptions 
of freedom of speech, on the one hand, with the increasing recognition that 
the proliferation of abuse must be addressed, on the other, is just beginning. 
Some civil society initiatives have started this work by articulating best 
practice standards for balancing speech and privacy interests in a legitimate 
way. This work should be encouraged — and must be extended to develop 
broader action within both telecommunications businesses and governments. 
Likewise, some telecommunications businesses, working with and led by civil 
society organisations, have sought to respond in positive ways to abuse 
perpetrated on and through their networks. This work too is only beginning 
— but we are optimistic, given the increasing visibility of controversies 
around abuse and how much has been achieved in recent years. 
